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10.1    Introduction
Temporary help work has expanded rapidly across Europe over the last 
decade. While concerns have been raised about this trend expansion, because 
of the perceived inferior quality of jobs created in this submarket, growing 
attention is being paid to the potential longer-  term eﬀects of temporary 
help service (THS) employment on the labor market prospects of workers. 
Labor turnover in this industry is exceedingly high, and THS employment 
spells generally constitute but a short transitory period in the labor market 
histories of workers. Policymakers throughout Europe, in fact, have taken 
an increasingly active stance over the last years in further promoting THS 
work by dismantling existing national regulations on temporary help work 
that circumscribed the operation of temporary help agencies and the use of 
THS workers by client ﬁ  rms.
The German case constitutes a prime example of this trend. Because of 
the strong employment record of the THS industry in Germany and the 
acclaimed stepping- stone function of THS work to regular employment for 
the jobless, restrictive provisions of the Law on Placement Activity (LoPA), 
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which governs the operation of the German THS submarket since 1972, 
were increasingly relaxed during the 1990s, a process that culminated in 
the large-  scale labor market reform legislated in late 2002.1 Among other 
measures, the latter initiated a near complete dismantling of hitherto exist-
ing regulations imposed on temporary help work in Germany (for details, 
see Burda and Kvasnicka 2006). With stubbornly high rates of unemploy-
ment putting a drain on public resources and the eﬃciency of the federal 
employment service increasingly being questioned, policymakers in Ger-
many saw THS work as a cost-  eﬀective and complementary means to get 
the unemployed back into work. Apart from the deregulation of the Law on 
Placement Activity (LoPA), this is evinced by the large- scale creation follow-
ing the 2002 reform of subsidized temporary help agencies, or personnel- 
service- agencies (PSA), in all of Germany’s 181 employment oﬃce districts. 
These PSA operate as ordinary THS agencies for the sole purpose of provid-
ing unemployed workers ports of entry to the labor market and, above all, 
subsequent springboards to social security employment (“temp-  to-  perm”) 
by way of temporary work assignments with diﬀerent ﬁ  rms. What is surpris-
ing about these initiatives is that solid empirical evidence for the existence 
of such a stepping- stone function of THS work for unemployed job seekers 
was in fact lacking for Germany, and internationally sparse at best.
Using statistical matching techniques, this chapter investigates the valid-
ity of the stepping-  stone hypothesis of THS work in Germany. We conﬁ  ne 
the empirical analysis to an investigation of the stepping-  stone function of 
THS employment for unemployed job- seekers only. This restriction in focus 
is inspired by the fact that the most recent reform of the law on placement 
activity in Germany has been enacted largely for the acclaimed bridging 
function of THS work for this particular group of workers. With about 
every second worker entering THS work in Germany from unemployment, 
the population of interest chosen does, however, represent a signiﬁ  cant share 
of all inﬂ  ows into THS work. Conditioning the analysis on prior unemploy-
ment experience has the additional advantage of providing some sort of 
initial condition among the sample chosen—excluding, for instance, stu-
dents and pupils who only perform vacation work in a THS agency, without 
seeking any steady employment. Focusing on the ﬁ  rst unemployment spell 
of individuals who register as unemployed in 1994 to 1996, we are able 
to follow these workers for up to a minimum of ﬁ  ve years and hence are 
in a position to study both the short-  term and long-  term eﬀects of THS 
work experience on their subsequent employment trajectories. The matching 
approach employed in this study is based on the methodology applied by 
Barbara Sianesi in her studies on the short-  and long- term eﬀects of worker 
participation in Swedish labor market programs (Sianesi 2001, 2004).
Our results show that unemployed workers who enter THS employment 
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within twelve months of unemployment registration beneﬁ  t from both 
higher monthly employment (THS or non-  THS) and THS employment 
chances, as well as from signiﬁ  cantly reduced monthly risks of unemploy-
ment throughout the four- year period these workers are followed post- entry 
compared to similar workers who did not join THS work at the same elapsed 
unemployment duration. Temporary help service workers, however, do not 
appear to enjoy greater chances of future non-  THS employment. While 
our results, therefore, do not lend empirical support to the stepping-  stone 
hypothesis of THS work for unemployed job-  seekers, they neither conﬁ  rm 
the existence of adverse eﬀects of agency work on the future chances of 
workers to ﬁ  nd employment outside agency work nor to return to unem-
ployment. If anything, THS work seems to provide an access- to- work func-
tion for unemployed workers that leaves them with a higher probability of 
employment and a lower probability of unemployment for the entire four 
years their subsequent labor market states are followed.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will, as is commonly done, refer to 
social-  security employment outside the THS industry as “regular employ-
ment.” This is understood, at least in part, as a terminological convention. 
For apart from the irregular triangular setup of the THS submarket, workers 
in the German THS industry do in fact enjoy the same employment pro-
tection and worker rights as other workers under the provisions of general 
labor and social security law (Klös 2000). Temporary help service workers are 
regular employees of their agencies, for which the two bodies of law regulate 
and provide minimum standards regarding health and safety in the work-
place, worktime, paid annual leave, sick pay, and periods of notice and dis-
missal protection more generally. Temporary help service workers are covered 
by the public pension and unemployment insurance system and must have 
health insurance. To all three of these, the agency and THS worker contribute 
equally. The distinction between regular and THS employment is hence not 
grounded in a generally inferior legal position of THS workers. In practice, 
of course, working conditions encountered may diﬀer, sometimes consider-
ably so. Until recently, wages and working conditions of most THS workers 
in Germany were not determined by collective bargaining to the eﬀect that 
workers in agency work tended to be paid less and enjoyed less fringe beneﬁ  ts, 
such as extra holiday pay or on- the- job training, than workers employed out-
side agency work (a large fraction of such wage diﬀerences, however, as shown 
by Kvasnicka and Werwatz [2002], can be attributed to earnings- related pro-
ductivity diﬀerences between agency and nonagency workers). Furthermore, 
employment spells in THS work often fall short of probabitionary periods 
granted by law in which layoﬀs are permitted at signiﬁ  cantly shorter notice.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 surveys arguments for 
and against the existence of a stepping- stone function of THS work, section 
10.3 reviews the existing literature on the subject, and section 10.4 describes 
the data. Section 10.5 addresses the evaluation problem encountered in esti-338    Michael  Kvasnicka
mating the stepping- stone function of THS work and proposes an appropri-
ate framework for empirical evaluation. Section 10.6 contains the empirical 
results, and section 10.7 concludes.
10.2    Preliminary  Considerations
A number of reasons have been cited in the literature as to why THS work 
may provide a bridge to regular employment for the unemployed. First, 
THS workers are frequently recruited among the un-   or nonemployed and 
are hence given access to paid work or entry-  level jobs (see, for example, 
Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson [1985]), otherwise potentially denied to them 
on the general labor market. Surveys of THS workers show that one of the 
main reasons for taking up a job in the THS industry is the inability to ﬁ  nd 
a regular job (see, for example, CIETT [2000] for Europe, Cohany [1998] for 
the United States, or IWG [1995] for Germany). Second, unemployed work-
ers may acquire skills and gain work experience in THS jobs that increase 
their productivity and hence improve their future labor market prospects 
(Autor, Levy, and Murnane 1999; Paoli and Merrlié 2001; Kvasnicka and 
Werwatz 2003), which puts to a halt the depreciation of human capital that 
would take place in continued unemployment. Third, the search for regular 
employment may be more eﬀective on a THS job than in unemployment, 
as work assignments with client ﬁ  rms provide opportunities for workers to 
get to know diﬀerent potential employers (Storrie 2002), and to signal their 
ability (Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 2005). Fourth, employers may, in turn, 
deliberately utilize temporary help work as a riskless screening device to 
prospect and recruit workers for permanent positions (Segal and Sullivan 
1997a; Houseman 1997; Abraham and Taylor 1996; Autor 2001). As client 
ﬁ  rms are in no way contractually bound to THS workers during a work 
assignment, on-  the-  job screening is possible without subjecting oneself to 
any ﬁ  ring restrictions or direct monetary ﬁ  ring costs. Finally, THS workers 
are prescreened by the agency, both in terms of general marketable skills 
when recruiting the worker, and in terms of the speciﬁ  c requirements of 
client ﬁ  rms for a particular work assignment (Autor 2001; Burda and Kvas-
nicka 2006). Increased screening may in turn also lead to better and therefore 
more stable employment relationships, as match quality is improved by prior 
extensive on-  the-  job screening (Katz and Krueger 1999).
However, there have also been dissenting voices, pointing out that THS 
workers often cycle between short employment spells in the industry and 
extended periods of unemployment (Bronstein 1991), leading to poten-
tial labor market segmentation into low wage, less stable THS jobs with 
little opportunities for career advancement and highly paid permanent 
jobs (Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson 1985; Segal and Sullivan 1997a). In 
particular, THS agencies are likely to provide less formal training on the 
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marketable skills, by deﬁ  nition the only skills traded on this submarket, 
increase the risk of the worker being poached before the agency can recoup 
its outlays through temporary work assignments. Temporary help service 
employment, especially when full time, may also crowd out productive 
direct-  hire job search. Finally, THS employment may stigmatize workers 
in the eyes of potential employers under incomplete information, as their 
inability to obtain regular work may be perceived by the latter as a signal 
of low productivity.
10.3    Previous  Research
Lack of adequate longitudinal data on the individual employment his-
tories of temporary help workers has tended to circumscribe empirical 
research on the stepping-  stone function of THS work. However, a number 
of studies exist for diﬀerent countries that have investigated the eﬀect of 
agency work on the future labor market prospects of workers. These studies, 
as will be seen, diﬀer markedly in their respective methodologies employed, 
institutional settings investigated, and populations of workers considered, 
a heterogeneity that makes it diﬃcult to draw general conclusions. With the 
notable exception of the quasi- experimental study by Autor and Houseman 
(2005), however, work in this area has tended to ﬁ  nd that THS employ-
ment improves rather than harms the subsequent labor market outcomes 
for workers.
While existing studies for Europe are in the majority descriptive in nature 
(see Storrie [2002] for a recent survey), they are exclusively so for Germany. 
Based on administrative data from the German federal employment ser-
vice, Rudolph and Schröder (1997), for instance, calculate that a third of 
all THS jobs that were dissolved between 1980 and 1990 in Germany led to 
subsequent transitions of workers into non-  THS employment within one 
month of job termination. Similarly, using retrospectively collected survey 
data on THS workers who left a major THS company in the second half 
of 1986, Brose, Schulze-  Böing, and Mayer (1990) ﬁ  nd that after their THS 
employment spell, more workers are employed outside agency work and 
less are unemployed than before their engagement in agency work. Lacking 
a comparison group of workers in their respective analyses, however, both 
studies do not permit any causal interpretation of their ﬁ  ndings.2
Diﬀerent types of ﬂ  exible employment forms, such as ﬁ  xed-  term contract, 
casual, THS, or part- time employment, have also been frequently subsumed 
under the ambiguous catch-  all term “temporary employment” to then esti-
mate their impact on the future labor market prospects of those holding 
2. The same applies to other studies that have documentated transitions out of agency work 
without any reference to a suitably chosen control group of workers who did not join agency 
work. Examples include the studies by Finegold, Levenson, and van Buren (2003), and Segal 
and Sullivan (1997b) for the United States.340    Michael  Kvasnicka
these jobs. Marked diﬀerences in their respective contractual arrangements, 
employment compositions, and economic roles, however, raise the question 
to what extent results obtained from such analyses do in fact apply to each 
and every of these heterogeneous employment forms considered. For the 
United Kingdom, for instance, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002) study 
the eﬀects on subsequent employment of temporary work, which in their 
study includes agency and ﬁ  xed- term contract work. Similarly, Zijl, Heyma, 
and van den Berg (2004) subsume workers on ﬁ  xed-  term employment con-
tracts, in THS work, on on- call contracts, and in subsidised temporary jobs. 
They estimate a multistage duration model using longitudinal survey data 
for the Netherlands. Their ﬁ  ndings support a stepping-  stone function for 
these contingent employment forms, as the latter tend to shorten unemploy-
ment durations and signiﬁ  cantly increase the future chances of workers to 
be in standard employment.
Positive employment eﬀects have also been found in the majority of stud-
ies that focus exclusively on the consequences of THS employment. Using 
Spanish social security administrative data for 1995 to 2000, García-  Pérez 
and Muñoz- Bullón (2005) estimate a switching regression model to control 
for self- selection into agency work so as to quantify the eﬀects of THS work 
spells on occupational upgrading and the chances of workers to ﬁ  nd perma-
nent employment (deﬁ  ned as holding an open-  ended work contract). The 
results show that especially high- skilled workers beneﬁ  t in their subsequent 
chances of obtaining such employment from a work spell in THS employ-
ment. Almus et al. (1999), in turn, examined whether workers unemployed 
in late 1996 in the German state of Rhineland- Palatinate beneﬁ  ted in terms 
of their postagency work employment chances from working in nonproﬁ  t 
THS ﬁ  rms that received special subsidies under a program of the federal 
German government designed to assist the reintegration of unemployed 
job-  seekers. Using data for three employment oﬃce districts, they ﬁ  nd for-
mer agency workers to exhibit signiﬁ  cantly higher chances of employment 
outside agency work than the control group of unemployed workers not 
previously working in nonproﬁ  t agency work. Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 
(2005), also applying propensity-  score matching, estimate the eﬀect of a 
THS work assignment with Manpower in two regions of Italy in early 2001 
on the probability to ﬁ  nd a permanent job after eighteen months. They ﬁ  nd 
THS work to increase the chances of permanent employment for workers 
by as much as 19 percentage points in Tuscany and by 11 percentage points 
in Sicily, compared to baseline probabilities of matched controls of 31 and 
23 percent, respectively. This estimated treatment eﬀect, however, is barely 
signiﬁ  cant for Sicily. Furthermore, it is highly heterogeneous with respect to 
observable characteristics such as age, education, and ﬁ  rm’s sector. Finally, 
Autor and Houseman (2005) exploit the random assignment of welfare-
 to- work clients in 1999 to 2003 (Work First program) across several welfare 
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help jobs in a major metropolitan area in the U.S. state of Michigan to 
study the eﬀect of holding a THS job on the labor market advancement for 
low-  skilled workers. They ﬁ  nd THS jobs to boost the short-  term earnings 
of welfare clients, but to reduce their earnings and employment chances one 
to two years later, and to increase their welfare recidivism over this period. 
Temporary help service jobs, the authors conclude, appear overall no more 
eﬀective than providing no job placements at all for low-  skilled workers.
As this literature review illustrates, there is great heterogeneity in the meth-
odologies used by diﬀerent studies (e.g., mere descriptive statistics, statisti-
cal matching, quasi- experiments), their respective settings investigated (e.g., 
entire countries, regions, or subpopulations such as welfare clients), and 
deﬁ  nitions of treatment used (e.g., THS work, or contingent work more gen-
erally, such as ﬁ  xed- term contract employment and agency work). While the 
majority of studies tends to ﬁ  nd positive eﬀects of THS employment on the 
subsequent labor market outcomes of workers, the only quasi- experimental 
that exists does not, which makes it hard to draw any general conclusions 
regarding the existence and quantitative importance of the stepping-  stone 
function of THS work. With this study on the German THS submarket, we 
hope to contribute to this actively researched area.
10.4    The  Data
The analysis is based on an extended version of the public-  use IAB 
Employment Sample (IABS) of the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB) at the German Federal Employment Agency, a 2 percent random 
sample of all employees registered in the period 1975 to 2001 by the social 
security system in Germany (data on East German workers is included from 
1992 onward). Employment information in the IABS is based on statutory 
notiﬁ  cations of employers on their workforces to the institutions of the 
social security system. Containing a host of worker, ﬁ  rm, and job-  speciﬁ  c 
attributes, and with information on unemployment periods involving ben-
eﬁ  t payments added from the federal unemployment register, the IABS 
provides exact daily information on the employment and unemployment 
trajectories of more than one million individuals in the twenty-  seven years 
sampled. Large sample sizes and detailed ﬂ  ow information are indispensable 
for analyses of the THS industry, as the latter still accounts for only a small 
employment share in the German economy and is characterized by very high 
rates of labor turnover. As administrative data, typical problems besetting 
longitudinal survey data, such as panel mortality due to nonresponses, or 
memory gaps in retrospective questions, are not encountered in the IABS 
(Bender, Haas, and Klose 2000).
However, the IABS also has a number of potential shortcomings for the 
present analysis. First, as THS employment is identiﬁ  ed by the industry 
aﬃliation of an employer in the IABS, THS workers cannot be diﬀerentiated 342    Michael  Kvasnicka
from the administrative staﬃng personnel of THS ﬁ  rms in the data set. This 
shortcoming, encountered also in other data sets that have been used for 
analyses of THS employment, such as the U.S. Current Population Survey, 
is, however, unlikely to be of major practical importance for our analysis, 
as the workforce share of staﬃng personnel is generally very small. Second, 
as the THS ﬁ  rm alone issues the statutory employment notiﬁ  cations, the 
IABS neither contains information on client ﬁ  rms nor on work assignments 
of THS workers (this shortcoming is also shared with all public- use admin-
istrative data sources, which by design are tailored to the standard bilateral 
employment relationship). Lack of information on client ﬁ  rms implies that 
we are unable to tell whether a successful transition to regular employment 
occurred to a former client ﬁ  rm or not. As a consequence, we may not directly 
test the relative importance of the screening and signalling hypotheses for the 
stepping- stone function of THS work. Our analysis, by necessity, will hence 
be a reduced form in kind, seeking to uncover a causal eﬀect of THS work 
without explicitly analyzing its potential causal pathways (see section 10.5.1, 
Treatment and Nontreatment Status, for further discussion of this point). 
Complementary future research could fruitfully analyze these pathways and 
assess their respective quantitative importance for any stepping- stone func-
tion of THS work. Finally, covering only employment relationships that are 
subject to social security contributions, civil servants, the self- employed, and 
those in marginal dependent employment (until 1999) are not included in 
the IABS. We may therefore only investigate the employment trajectories of 
workers in such dependent employment.
In the next section, we discuss in detail the peculiar features of the pres-
ent evaluation problem of the stepping-  stone function of THS employ-
ment for the unemployed in comparison to an archetypical-  administered 
social experiment. In doing so, we deﬁ  ne key terms, such as treatment (THS 
employment) and nontreatment status (the counterfactual for the treated), 
as well as various outcome measures that describe workers’ future employ-
ment prospects, so as to formulate testable causal questions about the 
stepping-  stone function of THS work, subject to the restrictions imposed 
by the nature of the phenomenon under investigation and the data available. 
Sample selection issues will be addressed in the course of this discussion, 
so that a presentation of summary statistics on major variables recorded in 
the data is deferred until then.
10.5    The  Evaluation  Problem
10.5.1      Evaluating the Stepping-  Stone Function of THS Work
The archetypical- administered social experiment is conducted only once, 
with a speciﬁ  c starting and ending date, clearly circumscribed in the nature 
and scope of the treatment provided therein (e.g., a particular one-  time Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 4 3
training program), and linked to speciﬁ  c formal eligibility requirements for 
participation (e.g., a certain skill level of workers, or a minimum elapsed 
unemployment duration). None of these features, however, applies to the 
present evaluation problem of the stepping- stone function of THS employ-
ment for the unemployed. As an ongoing program, unemployed workers may 
join THS work both at diﬀerent calendar dates and at diﬀerent individual-
 elapsed unemployment durations. In addition, employment spells in the THS 
industry vary endogenously in length. Temporary help service workers may 
also be assigned to diﬀerent numbers of client ﬁ  rms for diﬀerent durations 
and for diﬀerent tasks, rendering THS employment heterogeneous across 
workers in several respects that are endogenously determined but post- entry. 
An unemployed worker may furthermore hold a THS job more than once, 
and thus be subject to multiple treatments with interspersed repeated spells 
of unemployment or regular employment. One and the same worker may 
therefore be counted as treated at one point in time (when in THS work) 
and as nontreated at another. Finally, formal requirements for participation 
are absent. General proﬁ  table employability, a function of both individual 
characteristics of the unemployed job- seeker and general labor market con-
ditions encountered, is alone decisive for temporary help agencies in the 
recruitment process. Likewise, unemployed workers decide on whether to 
seek employment in THS work, based on factors that determine job search 
behavior in general, such as the likelihood of ﬁ  nding alternative employment 
opportunities, reservation wages, and the like.
The deﬁ  nition of outcomes is equally beset with diﬃculties. Above all, the 
question to be addressed is when one should start to measure outcomes, both 
for those treated and for those not treated. For the former, the more obvious 
choice is between the start of a THS employment spell and its end, depend-
ing on how THS employment is valued relative to regular employment or 
the speciﬁ  c causal question asked. For those workers not treated, the case is 
even more ambiguous, as neither entry date to nor exit date from THS work 
are observed. These speciﬁ  c features inevitably require choices to be made 
with respect to the timing, as well as the deﬁ  nition of potential treatment 
and control groups. This we do in the remainder of this section, beginning 
with the units (workers) to be analyzed—that is, the sample selected.
Sample Selection
For the ensuing analysis, we select all individuals who in 1994 to 1996 reg-
ister as unemployed and consider only their ﬁ  rst unemployment spell in this 
period.3 This allows us to observe the subsequent employment histories of 
those workers for an extended period of time in the IABS (up to a minimum 
total of ﬁ  ve years). Entries into unemployment are sampled over a three- 
3. An unemployment spell is deﬁ  ned as consecutive unemployment notiﬁ  cations for an indi-
vidual in which the time between these notiﬁ  cations does not exceed one week.344    Michael  Kvasnicka
year period to increase the absolute number of subsequent transitions to 
THS work observed in the data. The years of entry chosen have the advan-
tage to suﬃciently predate the 1997 reform of the LoPA, which, among other 
things, introduced a one-  time exemption to the general rehiring ban in the 
THS industry. We further restrict this inﬂ  ow sample to individuals who are 
between eighteen and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve years of age at the time of unemployment 
registration. The upper age limit is imposed to reduce the likelihood of 
sampling older workers who may be entitled to some form of early retire-
ment scheme that permits them to exit unemployment straight into inactivity 
without having to search for a job or accept job oﬀers by the public employ-
ment service while drawing beneﬁ  ts. Furthermore, we exclude workers who 
lack some prior employment experience. This measure is imperative, given 
the data collection process, for important worker attributes, in particular the 
educational- vocational qualiﬁ  cations obtained, are recorded in employment 
notiﬁ  cations issued by employers, but not in the information collected in and 
contributed to the IABS from the federal unemployment register.
These restrictions leave us with a raw total of 106,383 workers in the 
sample selected who enter unemployment between 1994 and 1996. Summary 
statistics on major variables for this sample recorded at the time of inﬂ  ow 
into unemployment are provided in appendix table 10A.1. As documented 
in table 10.1 following, 0.4 percent of these unemployment spells are right-
 censored at the end of 2001, and 7.1 percent end with no subsequent transi-
tion recorded within the sampling period 1994 to 2001. Of all unemployed 
workers, 68.1 percent enter a regular job (non-  THS employment), almost 
eight out of ten within one month of exiting unemployment. Another 2.3 
percent of the unemployed leave for a THS job, the great majority (80.8 
percent) again within one month.
It is noteworthy that a much larger fraction, or 8.0 percent of all entries 
into unemployment at some point until December 2001, do in fact take 
Table 10.1  Transitions to THS and regular employment of unemployment inﬂ  ows in 
1994–1996
Group of workers   Absolute number   Share (%)
Total entries into unemployment 106,383 100
    With right-  censored unemployment spells in 2001 429 0.4
    With no subsequent record in sampling period 7,531 7.1
Who subsequently enter THS work
  Within    1 month of exiting unemployment 2,006 1.9
  After    1 month of exiting unemployment 477 0.4
    At some point within sampling period 8,529 8.0
Who subsequently enter regular work
  Within    1 month of exiting unemployment 59,070 55.5
  After    1 month of exiting unemployment   13,441   12.6
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up a job in the THS sector. With close to one in ten unemployed workers 
joining THS work over this period, THS employment appears to be more 
dispersed in the working population than its still small employment share in 
the economy suggests. In addition, but not shown in table 10.1, 85.5 percent 
of all direct entries into THS work (those who enter within one month of 
exiting from unemployment), do eventually ﬁ  nd regular employment within 
the sampling period. The latter statistic is especially important in the present 
context, for a high “frequency of transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment suggests that the size of any permanent ‘underclass’ of tempo-
rary workers must be small” (Segal and Sullivan 1997a, 123). No subsequent 
transitions out of THS work are observed for only 2.2 percent of direct 
entries into THS employment. Moreover, only four out of ten of these 2.2 
percent are accounted for by right-  censored THS employment spells at the 
end of the sampling period. The median duration of THS job spells is four 
months (124 days). Sixty percent of them last less than half a year, 79 percent 
less than one year, and 92 percent end within two years.
However, past work experience in the THS sector seems to aﬀect the prob-
ability of renewed entry into THS work. As table 10.2 shows, 13.2 percent 
of workers with some prior THS work experience exit unemployment for 
a THS job, compared to only 1.7 percent of workers who never worked in 
the THS sector. An even larger fraction (24.0 percent) of workers who enter 
unemployment directly from THS work again take up a THS job within one 
month of exiting from unemployment, but only one in eight of these return 
to their previous THS agency. Thus a sizeable fraction of THS workers, at 
least in the short-  to-  medium run, indeed appears to cycle between unem-
ployment and temporary help service work spells before eventually ﬁ  nding 
regular employment. The vast majority of THS workers, however, do not. 
Additional explorations, not shown in table 10.2, underscore the importance 
Table 10.2  Subsequent transitions to THS and regular employment of unemployment inﬂ  ows in 
1994–1996 by prior THS work experience
Subsequent direct transition to
THS work
THS work experience prior to entry 










No subsequent transition 
observed in the data (%)
Anytime in the past 56.2 13.2 4.9
Entered unemployment from THS work 47.6 24.0 3.2 4.4
None   68.8    1.7       7.6
Source: IABS.
Note: A direct transition is deﬁ  ned as the taking up of employment within thirty days of exiting from 
unemployment. Deviations of row totals from 100 percent are comprised of transitions to employment 
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of the THS submarket for labor market ﬂ  ows, and of past THS work experi-
ence for the likelihood of unemployed workers to enter THS employment. 
Workers with prior THS work experience and workers who enter unem-
ployment directly from a THS agency, respectively, account for 5.1 percent 
and 1.5 percent of all entries into unemployment and for 29.0 percent and 
11.5 percent of all observed subsequent direct transitions from unemploy-
ment to temporary help work. Rehirings within the THS industry, however, 
occur far less frequently than on the general labor market. Six percent of all 
workers last employed at a THS agency, in fact, return to the same agency 
when leaving unemployment. In contrast, 11.8 percent of workers enter-
ing unemployment from a regular job again return to the same employer 
when leaving unemployment. The rehiring ban imposed by the LoPA at 
the time is likely to be in the main accountable for this discrepancy, for a 
signiﬁ  cant share of former THS workers, as we have seen, do in fact return 
to THS work, albeit not to the same employer. An additional reason is that 
THS workers are likely to accumulate less ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c human capital when 
in temporary help work, which reduces their attachment to former THS 
employers.
In the following, we restrict the analysis to transitions of individual 
workers to other labor market states (regular or non-  THS employment, 
and THS work) that occur within one month of leaving unemployment 
(direct transitions). Apart from workers with some prior unemployment 
experience, we also retain workers in the analysis who have been employed 
in the THS sector—that is, “treated,” before entering unemployment in 
1994 to 1996, because of the scale of reentry into THS work documented 
previously. Exclusion of either of these two groups of workers from the 
analysis would likely result in above-  average productivity individuals being 
sampled. It would also restrict the treatment eﬀect investigated to a signiﬁ  -
cantly reduced subsample of THS inﬂ  ows from unemployment, which, at 
least from a policy perspective, does not represent the group of unemployed 
workers mostly concerned with in the context of the stepping- stone function 
of THS work. For completeness, however, we consider the case of unem-
ployed workers with no prior work experience in THS employment in section 
10.6.2, where we investigate potential heterogeneities in the treatment eﬀects 
of THS work on the future regular employment chances of individuals for 
diﬀerent subgroups of workers.
Treatment and Nontreatment Status
With respect to the deﬁ  nition and the timing of the treatment, we con-
sider the ﬁ  rst entry of workers into THS employment after having registered 
as unemployed in 1994 to 1996. Any subsequent treatments are therefore 
viewed as outcomes of the initial treatment. More speciﬁ  cally, we deﬁ  ne 
treatment as entry into THS employment. Assuming the causal eﬀects of 
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THS employment experience across workers (e.g., in terms of employment 
duration, number of work assignments), and focus on the overall or average 
eﬀects of joining THS work on the subsequent labor market prospects of 
workers. As noted, practical restrictions imposed by the data, in particular 
the complete lack of information on client assignments, in part dictate this 
approach. However, one may argue for the deﬁ  nition of treatment adopted 
also on purely methodological grounds. For, in contrast to the archetypi-
cal program discussed previously, virtually all aspects of individual THS 
employment relationships formed are ultimately determined endogenously, 
depending on the post-  entry decisions of both the temporary help agency 
and the THS worker. Moreover, the available, albeit limited evidence for 
Germany on the distribution of client assignments across THS workers and 
on the transitions of THS workers to regular employment suggests that the 
ability of THS workers to sample many potential employers during tempo-
rary work assignments and the ability of client ﬁ  rms to screen THS workers 
during such work assignments for permanent positions may not, in fact, be 
of primary importance for the acclaimed stepping-  stone function of THS 
work. As the case study by Kvasnicka (2003) has shown, most THS workers 
have but a singular client assignment, while ﬁ  rst evidence on the recently cre-
ated PSA in Germany reveals that, in fact, less than a fourth of all transitions 
out of THS work into regular employment occurred to a former client ﬁ  rm 
(Jahn and Windsheimer 2004).
Outcomes, yet to be deﬁ  ned, are consequently measured from the month 
of entry into THS work for those actually receiving treatment. This raises 
the question as to when one should start to measure outcomes for those not 
observed to enter THS work. Theory suggests that unemployed workers 
conduct their job search sequentially, accepting or declining a particular job 
oﬀer depending on the respective net payoﬀs associated with either decision. 
There is, in addition, ample evidence that THS workers in the majority prefer 
regular employment to holding a job in the THS industry,4 largely because 
of the higher pay and superior working conditions expected to accrue in 
the former. Moreover, surveys reveal that unemployed workers frequently 
enter THS work after a period of unsuccessful search for a regular job, and 
because they hope to thereby improve their chances to ﬁ  nd regular employ-
ment (see, for example, IWG [1995]; CIETT [2000]; Cohany [1998]). In other 
words, unemployed workers are likely to decide sequentially whether to enter 
THS work in a given month of unemployment. This implies that for the con-
struction of an adequate control group for those actually observed to enter 
THS work in a given month of elapsed unemployment duration (u1), only 
those unemployed workers should be chosen as potential controls who have 
4. See, for example, Storrie (2002) for the European evidence, Finegold, Levenson, and van 
Buren (2003) for the United States, Hegewish (2002) for the United Kingdom, or IWG (1995) 
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been unemployed for at least u0   u1 and are not treated in u1. Note that these 
workers may well enter THS work and therefore be treated at a later month 
of elapsed unemployment duration. Thus while potential controls can be 
treated at a later stage, treated workers may never subsequently become con-
trols for workers who enter THS work at longer unemployment durations.
As individual months of entry into THS work (treatment) diﬀer across 
workers, we adopt a relative timescale in measuring subsequent outcomes 
(the eﬀects of the treatment) for the treated. For a matched control person, 
outcomes are measured from the observed u1 of the treated worker. How-
ever, as u1, that is, elapsed unemployment duration before entry into THS 
work, is an unobserved counterfactual for nontreated unemployed work-
ers, it cannot be included as a regressor in the estimation of the propensity 
score. We nevertheless condition the construction of matches on elapsed 
unemployment duration, by estimating separate propensity scores for every 
month (u), where each estimation is based on those treated in a particular u 
and those not treated in the same u. This approach is equivalent to estimating 
a discrete hazard- rate model, where all estimated parameters are allowed to 
be duration speciﬁ  c (Sianesi 2004, 140).
Choosing potential controls from such a duration-  based ﬂ  ow sample 
has an inherent advantage in the present context over the primary alterna-
tive comparison group design employed in the evaluation literature—that 
is, the exclusive selection of potential controls from among those workers 
never observed to enter the particular program investigated. For in the lat-
ter case, the construction of a comparison group is, in fact, conditioning 
on the future, and hence the outcomes when the program starts are not 
restricted to a particular period (see on this point, for example, Fredriksson 
and Johansson [2003]). In the current application, such restriction would, in 
all likelihood, introduce a downward bias in the estimated treatment eﬀects 
of THS work on the future regular employment probabilities of individuals, 
as unemployed workers who act as controls are likely to never be observed to 
enter THS work simply because they have instead made a successful transi-
tion to regular employment.
We next formalize these ideas in the form of the average treatment eﬀect 
on the treated (ATT) to be estimated in the present context, deferring a 
discussion of the diﬀerent outcome measures employed in this study to the 
subsequent subsection.
Formal Speciﬁ  cation of the Evaluation Problem
We formalize the evaluation problem based on Sianesi’s (2001/ 2004) expo-
sition in her application of statistical matching techniques to the evaluation 
of the eﬀectiveness of active labor market program in Sweden. The out-
comes of interest are various labor market states of individuals over time, 
that is, (Yjt
(u))T
t u 1, where j denotes the type of outcome, that is, the particular 
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outcomes are measured post elapsed unemployment duration of at least 
u months. At time u, the population of interest comprises workers with 
elapsed unemployment duration of at least u months. Treatment assignment 
is denoted by Du   (1, 0), with Du   1 for unemployed workers who join THS 
work in u, and Du   0 for those unemployed job seekers who have elapsed 
unemployment duration of at least u and do not join THS work in u. We 
further denote the potential labor market states of an individual at time t, 
where t   u, which joins THS work in his or her u’th month of unemploy-
ment with Y jt
1(u), and with Y jt
0(u) if an individual has not joined THS work up 
to that month, respectively.
The average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATTs),  u
jt, in the present 
application then correspond to the average eﬀects of joining THS work in 
month u of elapsed unemployment duration (Y jt
1(u)) compared to not joining 
THS work in that month (Y jt
0(u)) for those unemployed workers who actually 
take up a THS job in that same month (Du   1), that is,
(1)   u
jt  E(Y jt
1(u)   Y jt
0(u)⏐Du   1)
  E(Y jt
1(u)⏐Du   1)   E(Y jt
0(u)⏐Du   1) for t   u   1, . . . , T.
To identify the second term in equation (1), that is, the unobserved coun-
terfactual, we have to assume stable unit treatment value and conditional 
independence. The conditional independence assumption (CIA) in formal 
terms requires that:
(2)  Y jt
0(u) ⊥ Du⏐X   x for  t   u   1, . . . , T,
that is, for observably similar individuals (X   x) having reached the same 
elapsed unemployment duration (u), the distribution of potential nonpar-
ticipation outcomes (Y jt
0(u)) is the same for unemployed workers entering 
THS work (Du   1) and unemployed workers not entering THS work (D(u) 
  0) in month u. Common support in the present context amounts to the 
condition that:
(3) 0    Pr(Du   1⏐X)   1.
In other words, conditional on elapsed unemployment duration and indi-
vidual worker characteristics of interest, a potential control has to exist for 
each treated individual. In the empirical analysis, we set U   12; that is, we 
investigate the eﬀect of taking up a THS job within one year of registering 
as unemployed in the period 1994 to 1996. The period workers are followed 
while still in unemployment is restricted for two reasons. First, to have a 
suﬃciently long period at one’s disposal in which the subsequent labor mar-
ket outcomes of these workers can be studied in the IABS: with data until 
December 2001, this restriction provides us with at least forty- eight months 
for each individual worker, irrespective of the particular calendar months 
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shown in ﬁ  gure 10.1, the total number of transitions from unemployment 
to THS work declines rapidly with elapsed months of unemployment dura-
tion. More than eight out of ten (82.1 percent), or 1,647 out of the 2,006 
transitions to THS employment recorded in the sampling period 1994 to 
2001 take place within the ﬁ  rst year of unemployment.
Outcomes
To gain a comprehensive view of how the future labor market prospects 
of unemployed workers in Germany are aﬀected by taking up a job in the 
THS industry, we employ a set of four diﬀerent outcomes measures (Yjt
(u)), 
described in table 10.3. These (respectively) forty-  eight monthly post- 
treatment probabilities of regular employment (non- THS employment), THS 
employment, any type of employment (regular or THS), and unemployment 
allow us to study the dynamics of the eﬀects that taking up THS employment 
exert on the individual likelihoods of observing these states over time.
Fig. 10.1    Treated unemployed workers by month of entry into THS work
Source: IABS.
Note: Sample comprises inﬂ  ows to unemployment in 1994–  1996.
Table 10.3  Deﬁ  nition of outcome measures used in the empirical analysis
  Outcomes for each month up to four years post-  treatment  
Outcome 1 Monthly probability of regular employment
Outcome 2 Monthly probability of THS employment
Outcome 3 Monthly probability of employment (regular or THS)
  Outcome 4  Monthly probability of unemployment  Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 5 1
It is important to note that these monthly outcome measures refer to the 
respective probabilities of observing workers in a particular labor market 
state at any point in time during a particular month. As workers may natu-
rally spend time in more than one of these labor market states in a given 
month, outcomes 1, 2, and 4 are not mutually exclusive, and therefore, do 
not necessarily add up to 1 for a particular group of workers. Moreover, 
workers who return to education, or general inactivity—that is, states that 
are not recorded in the IABS, are retained in the respective monthly base 
groups from which the four outcome measures are calculated. For by vir-
tue of the data generation process, we have complete information on the 
employment (regular and THS) and unemployment trajectories of workers 
over time who comprise our individual outcome measures of interest; that 
is, employment subject to social security contributions and unemployment 
periods that involve some kind of entitlement to ﬁ  nancial support from the 
public authorities.
While Outcome 1 is of primary interest for the empirical assessment of the 
stepping-  stone function of THS work, the remainder does provide impor-
tant supportive evidence in this context. Outcome 2 provides information on 
the degree to which workers remain or tend to get stuck in the THS sector 
over time, whereas Outcome 3 conveys information on overall employment 
probabilities. The latter is of interest in its own right, for even if treated work-
ers turn out not to beneﬁ  t in their likelihood of obtaining regular work, or to 
suﬀer from increased risk of future unemployment (Outcome 4), they might 
still prove to enjoy relatively higher chances of employment in general.
10.5.2      Implementation of Propensity-  Score Matching
Nearest- Neighbor  Matching
We apply nearest-  neighbor propensity score matching without replace-
ment, but within caliper (Cochran and Rubin 1973).5 In other words, con-
ditional on elapsed unemployment duration u, each treated individual i in 
month u is matched to that nontreated individual z with the closest estimated 
propensity score p(X) and used as a control Ci for individual i, subject to 
the condition that the absolute diﬀerence in the two estimated propensity 
scores, that is, the degree of residual mismatch, does not exceed a certain 
maximum  , or caliper (see, for example, Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 
[1999, 1954]):




⏐ ⏐pi(X)   pz(X)⏐ ⏐.
In the empirical analysis, we set the caliper to     0.03. From these pairs 
of treated and control individuals, the nearest- neighbor matching estimator 
5. The matching estimator “psmatch2” by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for STATA is used and 
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estimates the j times t ATTs ( u
jt) for each entry month into THS work—
that is, u, as the diﬀerence in mean outcomes between the treated and their 
matched controls:
(5)   u










1(u)   yjt
0(u)),
where Nu1 is the number of matched treated workers with completed unem-
ployment duration u. Assuming independent observations, homoskedastic-
ity of the outcome variables within the treatment and control groups, and 
nondependence of the variance of the outcome on the propensity score 
(Lechner 2001), the variances of the ATTs,  u
jt can then be calculated as (see 
Sianesi 2001, 28):6
(6) Var( u













0(u)⏐Du   0),
where Du   1 and Du   0 denote matched treated and nontreated workers at 
time u, respectively, and  z is the number of times individual z is being used 
as a control, with ∑z=1
Nu0
  z   Nu1. As matching is conducted without replace-
ment to reduce the standard errors of the estimated eﬀects, however,  z   
1 for all controls, so that ∑z=1
Nu0
  z
2   Nu1, too. As the true propensity score 
is unknown, its estimate has to be used, which leads to reduced estimated 
variances of the ATTs. Standard errors may be obtained by bootstrapping, 
which, however, is not pursued here for the amount of computing time 
required.
Estimating the Propensity Score
The plausibility of the CIA in equation (2) depends on the richness of 
the available data with respect to the underlying mechanism that determines 
treatment assignment and future outcomes—that is, the ability to control for 
all factors that both determine selection into THS work and aﬀect potential 
outcomes in the two participation states. We discuss these factors in relation 
to the two principal actors involved; that is, the THS and the unemployed 
job- seeker, the potential restrictions imposed on their conduct by the LoPA, 
as well as the general labor market conditions they are confronted with.
The Temporary Help Agency  As pointed out before, few formal require-
ments besides general “proﬁ  table employability,” a function of both indi-
vidual characteristics of the unemployed job- seeker and general labor mar-
ket conditions, are relevant for temporary help agencies in the recruitment 
process. Deferring a discussion of the latter for the time being, the former 
6. Note, however, that unlike Sianesi (2001), we do not have to condition on treated work-
ers being observed at individual outcome months, as we do not have any measurement error 
in the labor market states of interest that underlie our outcome measures (see section 10.5.1 
[subsection 4]).Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 5 3
necessitates the consideration of attributes related to the productivity of 
individuals in the estimation of the propensity score. Besides personal char-
acteristics—that is, age, sex, foreign nationality, marital status, presence 
of children, as well as the highest educational and vocational attainment 
recorded for the worker, we control for the previous (recent and more distant) 
labor market history of individuals in the estimation of the propensity score. 
With respect to the last employment relationship, we control for employ-
ment tenure, real earnings, real average earnings in the last establishment, 
type of occupation held, part- time status, industrial sector, and whether the 
last job was a THS job. The latter in particular appeared quite signiﬁ  cant 
in the descriptive explorations of observed transitions from unemployment 
to THS work in section 10.5.1 (sample selection). Information on the last 
sector the worker was employed, in turn, is likely to capture human capital 
and work experience that might be of use in the mainly manual, industrial 
tasks THS workers are usually assigned to at client ﬁ  rms. In addition, and 
by virtue of the data set, key summary statistics with respect to individu-
als’ more distant labor market history are constructed. Attributes that are 
controlled for include whether the individual has ever worked in the THS 
sector before and whether the worker has ever been unemployed before. The 
latter acts as a proxy for past instability of employment, and possibly for 
the degree of labor market attachment of the worker, which itself may be 
related to unobserved individual characteristics related to worker productiv-
ity. Furthermore, a dummy for unemployment registration in the new Ger-
man Lander is included, where THS agencies have only been able to operate 
from 1990 onward, and annual as well as seasonal indicators are used to 
capture cyclical and seasonal variations in the demand of THS agencies 
for manpower. By virtue of conditioning on elapsed unemployment dura-
tions in the estimation of the propensity score, we also implicitly control 
for unobservables correlated with the duration of unemployment, such as 
average time-  invariant and time-  variant diﬀerences in individual worker 
productivity not captured by our other covariates measured only at entry 
into unemployment.
The Unemployed Job-  Seeker  The aforementioned factors are also likely 
to aﬀect the participation decision and future labor market outcomes of 
unemployed job-  seekers at a given time. Elapsed unemployment duration 
is of primary importance in this context. First, surveys, as noted, regularly 
ﬁ  nd unsuccessful search for a regular job to be one of the most important 
motives for taking up work in the THS sector, thereby lending support to 
the notion of sequential decision-  taking on the part of unemployed job- 
seekers of whether to join THS work. Second, beneﬁ  t entitlement levels, 
and thus the reservation wage, decline with elapsed unemployed duration. 
As remuneration in the THS sector generally falls short of levels attainable 
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a lower reservation wage, should be more likely to take up a THS job than 
workers who have just entered unemployment. Third, elapsed unemploy-
ment duration is likely to be correlated with individual unobserved ability, as 
more productive workers are, on average, more likely to exit unemployment 
quickly. And ﬁ  nally, job search activity and more generally “drive” are likely 
to decline with prolonged unemployment, as workers become discouraged. 
The latter raises the attractiveness of turning to THS agencies, who each 
manage a whole portfolio of potential job opportunities. Registering in the 
new German Lander and the local unemployment rate at entry are likely to 
have an eﬀect on the employment opportunities of individual job-  seekers, 
both in the THS sector and in other industries. We also control for the real 
gross daily earnings workers received at their last employer before enter-
ing into unemployment. These proxy individual worker productivity, and 
aﬀect beneﬁ  t entitlement levels as well as potential aspiration wages when 
searching for a new job in unemployment. As Kvasnicka and Werwatz (2002) 
have shown, relative earnings of workers who enter THS employment in 
Germany, on average, fall short of those of otherwise comparable workers 
even two to three years before actually entering temporary work. We in addi-
tion control for the type of entitlements received by a worker in a particular 
month of elapsed unemployment duration; that is, unemployment beneﬁ  ts, 
unemployment assistance, or unemployment support. The ﬁ  rst is limited in 
duration and generally exceeds the latter two in ﬁ  nancial terms. Eligibility 
for beneﬁ  t entitlements is conditional on past employment, and its level 
depends on the last income earned.
Restrictions Imposed by the Law on Placement Activity (LoPA) Before  its 
large-  scale deregulation in 2002, the LoPA contained a number of provi-
sions that circumscribed the terms and conditions under which agencies 
could employ workers and place them with client ﬁ  rms for temporary work 
assignments (a detailed discussion of the LoPA is provided in Jahn and 
Rudolph [2002] and Burda and Kvasnicka [2006]). The most important of 
these provisions limited the maximum permissible duration of work assign-
ments with client ﬁ  rms, banned the use of ﬁ  xed- term employment contracts 
between agency and worker (special ban on ﬁ  xed-  term contracts), prohib-
ited agencies to conﬁ  ne the term of an employment contract with a THS 
worker to the duration of his or her ﬁ  rst client assignment (synchroniza-
tion ban), and disallowed agencies to rehire a previously laid-  oﬀ worker 
within three months of employment termination (rehiring ban).7 All of these 
restrictive provisions served the same purpose of ensuring that agencies 
7. As we have seen in section 10.5.1 (subsection 1), rehirings among our unemployment 
inﬂ  ow sample in 1994 to 1996 indeed occurred much less frequently in the THS sector than in 
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indeed assumed employer responsibilities for their workforces. They pre-
vented agencies from simply adjusting their stock of THS workers in line 
with the often volatile demand for staﬃng services by client ﬁ  rms. Initially 
set to three months, the maximum permissible duration of work assignments 
was raised by quarter of a year in 1985, 1994, and 1997, and was further 
extended to twenty-  four months in 2002 before it was dropped altogether 
in the latest reform, which took eﬀect in 2004. As to the three bans, agen-
cies were permitted a respective one-  time exemption for each worker from 
April 1997, before they, too, were dropped altogether in 2004. In the case 
of the rehiring ban—that is, the only restriction imposed by the LoPA in 
the observation period on the conduct of THS agencies in the recruitment 
process, this exemption implied that agencies were henceforth allowed to 
once dismiss a worker and rehire her or him again with three months. By 
virtue of sampling only inﬂ  ows into unemployment between 1994 and 1996, 
however, the April 1997 reform of the rehiring ban is, in fact, immaterial 
for subsequent transitions of workers out of their spell of unemployment.
In our empirical analysis, we cannot directly account for the rehiring ban 
in its eﬀect on the recruitment behavior of THS agencies in the estimation 
of the propensity scores by way of a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if less than three months have elapsed since a worker has been laid oﬀ 
by a THS, and zero otherwise. We run separate probit regressions for each 
elapsed month of unemployment. As a consequence, in months of unem-
ployment greater than three, this indicator will always take the value zero—
that is, we will have no variation in the data, as the rehiring ban ceases to be 
binding for all workers still unemployed after three months. In the context of 
our matching algorithm, however, we would expect immediately preceding 
employment in the THS sector to have less of a positive eﬀect on the prob-
ability to reenter THS work in the ﬁ  rst three months of unemployment than 
in the fourth, if the rehiring ban does indeed exert a material inﬂ  uence. We 
do, in fact, ﬁ  nd such evidence (see appendix table A10.2).
General Labor Market Conditions  General labor market conditions inﬂ  u-
ence both the search behavior and potential employment chances of unem-
ployed job-  seekers, as well as the recruitment decisions of THS agencies. 
Labor demand of THS ﬁ  rms is known to be both highly procyclical and 
subject to strong seasonal variations. We control for general labor market 
conditions along three dimensions: cyclical, seasonal, and regional. Cyclical 
and seasonal factors are controlled for by annual and quarterly indicator 
variables, measured at entry into unemployment. These indicator variables 
also account for diﬀerences in the inﬂ  ow composition of workers into unem-
ployment. The average annual unemployment rate in the employment oﬃce 
district where the worker registers as unemployed, in turn, is used to capture 
diﬀerences in local labor market imbalances. Finally, recorded unemploy-356    Michael  Kvasnicka
ment registration in the new German Lander proxies for persistent structural 
diﬀerences between East and West Germany.
A note is in order on a problem that is commonly encountered in evalua-
tion studies; that is, the presence of anticipatory eﬀects of future treatment 
on the pretreatment behavior of workers and its likely pervasiveness in the 
current application. Anticipatory eﬀects of unemployed job- seekers, leading 
to reduced job search prior to entry into THS work (akin to Ashenfelter’s 
dip), are unlikely to be a major problem in the present evaluation problem of 
the stepping- stone function of THS work. Temporary help service agencies 
in Germany tend to hire workers predominantly on call, in line with current 
realizations of client demand (see Kvasnicka 2003), which is unlikely to be 
predictable with certainty even one or two weeks in advance. In addition, 
as already discussed, worker rehirings on the THS submarket at the time 
were prohibited within three months of prior employment termination, 
which eﬀectively circumscribes the problem of anticipatory eﬀects related 
to potential rehiring among workers who entered unemployment from 
THS work.
Matching Quality
The regression output of the probit estimations of the propensity scores 
for a number of treatment months are provided in appendix table 10A.2. 
All covariates except current entitlement status are measured at entry into 
unemployment. In particular, previous THS work experience and direct 
entry into unemployment from a THS job have a sizeable and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant positive eﬀect on the probability of transition to a THS job. 
Previous real earnings and the local unemployment rate, in contrast, sur-
prisingly never exert any statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on the likelihood of 
treatment assignment. The latter ﬁ  nding may be the product of two coun-
tervailing eﬀects of local labor market conditions on the probability of 
treatment. While unemployed job-  seekers may be more willing to accept a 
THS job, when other employment opportunities are scarce, THS agencies 
may only be inclined to recruit more workers when client demand for their 
services is high—that is, local labor market conditions are tight. Workers 
who spent less than one year in their last job, which proxies for past insta-
bility of employment, turn out to be at times more likely to enter THS 
work, potentially for the otherwise reduced chances to ﬁ  nd employment and 
lack of suﬃcient occupation-  speciﬁ  c skills acquired in their last job. Work-
ers entering unemployment from training also appear to be more inclined 
to take up a THS job in the ﬁ  rst months of their unemployment spells. 
Temporary help service work thus indeed appears to provide an access-  to-
  work function for recent labor market entrants. It is important to keep in 
mind that all estimated probit regressions are conditional on treated and 
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elapsed duration of unemployment. As the latter is likely to be correlated 
both with observable and unobservable worker characteristics, the respec-
tive monthly subsamples should already be more homogeneous than the 
full groups of treated and nontreated workers sampled for the entire ﬁ  rst 
twelve months of elapsed unemployment duration. As a consequence, the 
estimated coeﬃcients of the observable attributes controlled for in the indi-
vidual probit regressions measure only the impact of these covariates on the 
probability of treatment assignment conditional on elapsed unemployment 
duration. Following Sianesi (2004), table 10.4 provides various summary 
statistics on covariate balancing and hence matching quality for all twelve 
probit regressions.
Given the very large groups of potential controls available for each unem-
ployment month (column [3]), ﬁ  nding a suitable match partner for treated 
individuals is not a problem. Only one out of the 1,647 workers leaving 
unemployment for a THS job, as shown in column (10), are excluded for 
lack of common support.8 The pseudo- R2 from the individual probit regres-
sions before matching (column [4]) indicate the extent to which the covari-
ates explain the probability of treatment in a particular month of unem-
ployment. The respective pseudo-  R2 from monthly probit regressions after 
matching (column [5]) show that, on average, over the twelve probits run, 
the covariates continue to explain only 8 percent of the variance in treat-
ment assignment across the matched subsamples, and thus only about half 
the average respective ﬁ  gure obtained from the original samples of treated 
and nontreated workers. Associated probability values of likelihood ratio 
tests before and after matching are reported in columns (6) and (7). Whereas 
before matching, the null hypothesis of joint insigniﬁ  cance of the covari-
ates is always rejected for any of our twelve probit regressions, it is always 
accepted after matching. Matching on the estimated propensity scores leads 
to signiﬁ  cant improvements in the balancing of attributes between treated 
and (potential) control workers in the matched subsamples for each unem-
ployment month u, as shown by the respective median absolute standardized 
biases before and after matching (columns [8] and [9]).9
8. In the treated/  control group samples, the mean absolute distance in propensity scores 
between treated and control (neighbor) is very small: 0.00003 (standard deviation of 0.0003; 
max of 0.005). In terms of percentage diﬀerences in propensity scores between treated and con-
trols, the mean diﬀerence is 0.04 percent (standard deviation of 0.17 percent; max 4.5 percent). 
So overall, distributions show very close overlap.
9. The median is taken over all regressors and calculated for each unemployment month u, 
following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) as: BiasBefore (X)   (X 1 –   X 0)/{[  V 1(X)    V 1(X  )]/ 2} 
  100 before matching and as BiasAfter (X)   (X 1
M –   X 0
M)/{[  V 1(X)    V 1(X  )]/ 2}    100 after 
matching, where X  1 and X  0 are the respective sample means in the entire subsamples of treated 
and nontreated workers, V 1 (X) and V 1 (X) their associated variances, and X 1
M and X 0
M the 
respective sample means in the group of matched treated individuals within the common sup-
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10.6    Empirical  Findings
10.6.1      Summarizing Outcomes over Time
We begin with a graphical summary of the average time pattern of the 
diﬀerent treatment eﬀects, before presenting the results for the respective 
 u
jt by month of entry into THS work in section 10.6.2; that is, the causal 
eﬀects identiﬁ  ed under the CIA in equation (2). Following Sianesi (2004, 
140), an average eﬀect on each outcome measure j in outcome month t may 
be derived for the entire group of workers treated in their ﬁ  rst twelve months 
of unemployment as:
(7)  EU( u






1(u)   Yjt
0(u)⏐Du   1) P(Du   1⏐D   1)],
where E(Yjt
1(u) –   Yjt
0(u)⏐Du   1)    u
jt, which are weighted in the summation 
by the monthly entry distribution into THS work for those actually leaving 
unemployment for THS work—that is, P(Du   1⏐D   1). The following 
subsections graph estimates of these average monthly eﬀects on our four 
outcome measures together with 95 percent conﬁ  dence intervals calculated 
on the basis of equation (6) for the entire population of individuals treated 
in their ﬁ  rst twelve months of unemployment. These graphs summarize 
how unemployed job-  seekers who take up THS work, on average, fared in 
their subsequent employment and unemployment trajectories by joining 
THS work relative to the counterfactual situation in which they would have 
continued their job search in registered unemployment.
Outcome 1: Probability of Regular Employment
Figure 10.2 shows that entering a THS job has no statistically signiﬁ  -
cant eﬀect for most of our four-  year period that outcomes are measured 
on the monthly probabilities of regular employment. In other words, for 
the majority of months post treatment, neither a stepping-  stone eﬀect of 
THS employment nor an adverse eﬀect on the future probabilities of regular 
employment is discernable.
In the ﬁ  rst months, however, THS work appears to reduce the relative 
chances of being in a regular job, a diﬀerential eﬀect that subsequently 
turns slightly positive, and then seems to increase in the fourth year post 
treatment. The estimated reduced probabilities of regular employment are 
in all likelihood the result of a lock-  in eﬀect of program participation, as 
THS employment spells of treated workers have a median duration of four 
months (and a mean duration of eight- and- a- half months), as pointed out 
before. The positive diﬀerentials observable in the fourth year post treat-
ment, in turn, suggest that the potential advantages in terms of regular 
employment chances of taking up a THS job from unemployment tend to 
materialize rather late than early. It remains to be seen whether these posi-360    Michael  Kvasnicka
tive diﬀerentials in our descriptive graphical analysis for all workers who 
enter within their ﬁ  rst twelve months of unemployment registration remain 
when we explore the causal eﬀects of THS work for each entry month into 
unemployment—that is, the treatment eﬀects identiﬁ  ed under the condi-
tional independence assumption (equation [2]).
Some unemployed workers entering THS work might still be employed 
in their job at later outcome months, while others may also cycle between 
diﬀerent THS jobs. While inspection of ﬁ  gure 10.2 provides little support for a 
stepping- stone function of THS work for most of the four- year post- treatment 
period, it does not give an answer as to whether, and if so, to what extent unem-
ployed workers beneﬁ  t in their overall future probability of employment, be it 
regular or temporary help work employment, from entering a THS job from 
unemployment. Having explored the former constituent part of this outcome 
measure in ﬁ  gure 10.2, we next turn to the latter component (Outcome 2), 
before considering both parts in combination—that is, Outcome 3.
Outcome 2: Probability of THS Employment
As is evident from ﬁ  gure 10.3, individuals who leave unemployment for 
THS work are signiﬁ  cantly more likely throughout the four- year period that 
follows to be employed in the THS sector.
While the positive probability diﬀerential declines rapidly over the ﬁ  rst 
eight to nine months, its declines become subsequently less marked and 
the diﬀerential roughly stabilizes at around 11 percent toward the end of 
Fig.  10.2  Treatment  eﬀects over time on the probability of regular employment
Source: IABS. 
Note: Dashed lines denote 95 percent conﬁ  dence intervals.Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 6 1
Fig.  10.3  Treatment  eﬀects over time on the probability of THS employment
Source: IABS. 
Note: Dashed lines denote 95 percent conﬁ  dence intervals.
the observation period. Prolonged program duration and repeated program 
participation may, in general, be a matter of concern if it keeps workers from 
obtaining regular work. This does not seem, however, to be the case in the 
present context. For, as we have seen in ﬁ  gure 10.2, unemployed workers 
entering THS work, on average, do not exhibit statistically signiﬁ  cant lower 
monthly probabilities of regular employment than unemployed workers 
who chose not to join THS work as yet.
Outcome 3: Overall Probability of Employment
With respect to any social-  security employment (THS or regular), ﬁ  gure 
10.4 reveals that unemployed workers who take up a THS job exhibit a 
higher employment probability than those unemployed workers who do 
not join THS work in the same month of elapsed individual unemployment 
duration in each month following entry into the THS sector for the entire 
four-  year period under investigation.
With Outcome 3 being a composite of outcomes 1 and 2, and the general 
time pattern of treatment eﬀects discernable in ﬁ  gures 10.3 and 10.4, it is 
clear that the overall monthly employment probabilities quite closely re-
semble the levels and the trend of the increased likelihoods of THS employ-
ment for workers treated upon exit from unemployment. It remains to be 
seen how entry into THS work aﬀects the risks of future unemployment over 
time. As noted, our outcome measures are neither mutually exclusive nor all 362    Michael  Kvasnicka
Fig.  10.4  Treatment  eﬀects over time on the probability of employment
Source: IABS. 
Note: Dashed lines denote 95 percent conﬁ  dence intervals.
inclusive (e.g., inactivity is not considered as an outcome), so that we cannot 
infer the treatment eﬀects of THS work on a particular outcome from the 
treatment eﬀects estimated for the other outcomes.
Outcome 4: Probability of Unemployment
Figure 10.5 documents that monthly probabilities of unemployment are 
signiﬁ  cantly reduced for treated workers throughout the four-year obser-
vation period post-  entry into THS work, but tend to converge to those 
experienced by workers who were not treated as of yet toward the end of 
the four- year observation period. Summarizing the four ﬁ  gures considered, 
it appears that unemployed workers seem to substantially improve (reduce) 
their overall future employment chances (risks of unemployment), while 
only beneﬁ  ting potentially in terms of their future regular employment prob-
abilities from their engagement in THS work toward the latter quarter of 
the four- year period that their subsequent labor market states are followed.
10.6.2    Treatment  Eﬀects by Month of Entry into THS Work
Having so far explored the average dynamics of the diﬀerent treatment 
eﬀects, table 10.5 reports the respective causal eﬀects averaged over the forty-
 eight outcome months for diﬀerent entry months into THS work, as well as 
for the entire population of workers entering THS work within their ﬁ  rst 
twelve months of unemployment. The former only correspond to the causal 
eﬀects identiﬁ  ed under the CIA, equation (2), whereas the latter summarize Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 6 3
ﬁ  gures 10.2 to 10.5—that is, relates to the entire group of workers treated 
within their ﬁ  rst year of unemployment and thus represent a benchmark 
against which to discuss the variations in ATTs by month of entry into THS 
work. Estimated baseline outcome probabilities for the respective control 
groups corresponding to the diﬀerent groups of treated workers in table 
Fig.  10.5  Treatment  eﬀects over time on the probability of unemployment
Source: IABS. 
Note: Dashed lines denote 95 percent conﬁ  dence intervals.
Table 10.5  Average treatment eﬀects of THS work by unemployment month of entry into 
THS work
Eﬀect (percentage points)a
Outcomes   u   1–12   u   1   u   3   u   6   u   9   u   12
Reg. empl. 2.0 5.3 3.2 0.7 7.4 3.2
(–1.3;5.3) (–4.1;14.7) (–5.3;11.8) (–7.8;9.2) (–11.0;25.7) (–19.0;25.4)
THS empl. 24.0 24.7 25.1 26.6 27.8 20.1
(21.6;26.3) (18.1;31.4) (19.0;31.1) (18.4;34.8) (13.9;41.6) (5.9;34.4)
Any empl. 25.4 29.3 28.0 26.8 33.6 22.9
(22.1;28.7) (20.2;38.4) (19.6;36.4) (14.9;38.6) (15.3;51.9) (0.7;45.0)
Unemployment –17.0 –20.6 –20.4 –12.5 –20.3 –12.6
    (–20.1;–14.0)   (–28.7;–12.5)   (–27.9;–12.8)   (–23.9;–1.2)   (–38.1;–2.5)   (–33.4;8.2)
Source: IABS.
Note: Ninety-  ﬁ  ve percent conﬁ  dence intervals in parentheses; u   unemployment month of entry into 
THS work.
aAveraged over forty-  eight months post-  entry into THS work.364    Michael  Kvasnicka
10.5 are provided in appendix table 10A.3. As is evident, the averaged ATTs 
for the probability of regular employment are never signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent 
from zero, whereas those for the probabilities to be employed in the THS 
sector, or in either THS or regular work (any employment) are always strong 
positively and statistically signiﬁ  cantly aﬀected if unemployment is left for a 
THS job. Future risks of unemployment, in turn, are in general signiﬁ  cantly 
reduced for workers who take up a job in the THS sector. Although a marked 
systematic pattern by entry month into THS work is not observable for our 
four outcome measures, it appears that unemployed workers who join THS 
work very late in their unemployment spells (in the twelfth month) tend to 
fare worse, on average, than those workers who join earlier, with respect to 
both THS employment, any employment, and unemployment.
Overall, we may summarize the ﬁ  ndings in table 10.5 to suggest that 
unemployed workers beneﬁ  t in their overall future employment chances in 
the four-  year observation period from entering THS work, because of the 
increased likelihood of future THS employment, but are neither, on aver-
age, more likely to obtain regular employment, nor to suﬀer from increased 
risks of future unemployment in the outcome period. Quite to the contrary, 
they appear to beneﬁ  t substantially from reduced risks unemployment over 
the four-  year post-  treatment period considered. Sample sizes, however, are 
fairly small, which leads to large standard errors in the estimates of our ATTs 
obtained, as is evident from table 10.5. This is particularly a problem for 
our outcome measure of regular employment, for which all tabulated ATTs 
are insigniﬁ  cant, yet throughout positive. The estimated treatment eﬀects 
on regular employment are, however, quite small for entries into THS work 
at the various months of unemployment duration considered in table 10.5 
when compared to the baseline probabilities of regular employment for the 
respective matched control groups (see appendix table 10A.3).
The eﬀects of THS employment on the future regular employment chances 
of unemployed workers, that is, our outcome of primary interest, may diﬀer 
between subgroups of workers. In the following, a number of such groups 
are considered. Given the small sample size of unemployed workers that 
leave for a THS job and their rapidly declining numbers at longer-  elapsed 
unemployment durations, however, we have to restrict the analysis to transi-
tions to THS work that occur within the ﬁ  rst six months of unemployment 
registration. Table 10.6 tabulates the causal eﬀects for each subgroup on the 
probability of regular employment averaged over the forty-  eight outcome 
months for diﬀerent entry months into THS work, as well as, as a bench-
mark for the entire group of workers entering THS work within their ﬁ  rst six 
months of unemployment, together with the estimated baseline probability 
of regular employment of their matched controls.
As is evident, average treatment eﬀects over the four-  year outcome 
period are in the majority positive, though at several instances also nega-
tive, never statistically signiﬁ  cant for all entries months into THS work, and Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 6 5
mostly modest in absolute value if compared to the baseline probabilities of 
matched controls for the entire entry period considered. It is notable that the 
reduction in the upper age limit of workers considered to forty years, and 
the sample restriction to workers without some prior THS experience do not 
result for each entry month into THS work in generally higher average treat-
ment eﬀects for regular employment probabilities than for all workers who 
enter THS work within the ﬁ  rst six months of their unemployment spell. 
Furthermore, it appears that later entries into THS work (u   6) once again 
appear to beneﬁ  t less in their overall future regular employment chances 
than workers who enter THS employment earlier in their unemployment 
spell.
Finally, we want to look at the average treatment eﬀects on the prob-
ability of regular employment for only the fourth year post-  entry into THS 
work. For, as we have seen in ﬁ  gure 10.2, for the entire group of workers 
entering THS work within twelve months of unemployment registration, a 
positive diﬀerential in their monthly regular employment probabilities was 
discernable only in this fourth year of our observation period that outcomes 
are measured. Plotting the outcomes averaged over all entries into THS 
work within twelve months of their unemployment registration, this ﬁ  gure 
(like the other ﬁ  gures) did not have a causal interpretation, for the CIA, 
as noted, pertains only to treated workers and their matched controls who 
have identical elapsed unemployment durations at entry of the former into 
THS work. Considering only the averaged monthly regular employment 
diﬀerentials between treated and controls in the fourth year of our obser-
vation period, table 10.7 shows that neither for all workers that enter THS 
Table 10.6  Average treatment eﬀects of THS work on probability of regular employment by 
unemployment month of entry into THS work for diﬀerent subgroups of workers




  u   1–6   u   1   u   3   u   6
All workers (N   1,286) 35.8 1.3 5.3 3.2 0.7
(–2.5;5.0) (–4.1;14.7) (–5.3;11.8) (–7.8;9.2)
Aged 18–40 at entry into u. 
(N   1,059)
36.9 2.0 3.7 4.1 1.5
(–2.1;6.2) (–7.0;14.3) (–5.3;13.4) (–11.6;14.6)
No prior THS experience 
(N   864)
38.9 2.3 6.3 1.1 1.7
(–2.3;6.9) (–5.6;18.1) (–9.1;11.4) (–12.1;15.4)
Unempl. in W. Germany 
(N   874)
34.9 3.7 2.8 –3.0 5.2
(–0.8;8.2) (–9.0;14.6) (–13.5;7.5) (–8.8;19.3)
Men (N   1,038) 37.8 –2.4 1.2 –4.0 –1.7
        (–6.6;1.7)   (–9.5;11.9)   (–13.5;5.5)   (–14.1;10.8)
Source: IABS.
Note: Ninety-  ﬁ  ve percent conﬁ  dence intervals are reported in parentheses; N   No. of treated in unem-
ployment month of entry into THS work u   1–6.
aAveraged over forty-  eight months post-  entry into THS work.366    Michael  Kvasnicka
work within six months of their unemployment registration, nor for any of 
the four subgroups already considered, are estimates statistically diﬀerent 
from zero. Standard errors are, of course, once more very large due to the 
small sample sizes. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, positive estimates 
are again small in magnitude, and in a quarter even negative, suggesting that 
workers do not signiﬁ  cantly beneﬁ  t in quantitative terms from generally 
higher chances of regular employment four years post-  entry in THS work. 
Summing up the various analyses in this section, there is little evidence that 
suggests the existence of a general and signiﬁ  cant stepping- stone function of 
THS work to regular employment for unemployed job-  seekers in Germany 
in the time period considered.
10.7    Conclusion
Applying statistical matching techniques, this chapter has investigated the 
average eﬀects of entering THS work on the future labor market outcomes 
over a four-  year period of workers who registered as unemployed in 1994 
to 1996 relative to the counterfactual, in which these workers would have 
continued their job search in registered unemployment.
Unemployed workers who entered THS employment within twelve 
months of unemployment registration turned out to beneﬁ  t from both 
higher monthly chances of THS and overall employment (THS or regu-
lar employment) throughout the four-  year period these workers were fol-
Table 10.7  Average treatment eﬀects of THS work on probability of regular 
employment in the fourth year post-  treatment by unemployment month of 
entry into THS work for diﬀerent subgroups of workers
Eﬀect (percentage points)a
Groups of workers   u   1   u   3   u   6
All workers (N   1,286) 6.6 6.8 0.09
(–3.0;16.2) (–2.0;15.5) (–11.0;12.9)
Aged 18 to 40 at entry into u. (N   1,059) 7.9 8.3 –5.2
(–2.8;18.6) (–1.2;17.9) (–18.9;8.5)
No prior THS experience (N   864) 7.2 2.2 6.3
(–4.7;19.0) (–8.2;12.5) (–7.9;20.5)
Unempl. in W. Germany (N   874) 4.3 –2.3 –2.0
(–7.6;16.2) (–13.0;8.4) (–16.6;12.7)
Men (N   1,038) 3.2 0.9 –1.8
    (–7.6;14.1)   (–8.8;10.6)   (–14.9;11.4)
Source: IABS.
Note: Ninety- ﬁ  ve percent conﬁ  dence intervals are reported in parentheses; N   No. of treated 
in unemployment month of entry into THS work u   1–6.
aAveraged over the fourth year post-  entry into THS work.Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone?    3 6 7
Appendix
Table 10A.1  Summary statistics of the sample at entry into unemployment
Worker characteristics Previous real daily gross wage (€) 49.5
    Female 43.2 Ø real daily gross wage at employer (€) 54.9
    Foreign 9.4 Duration of last job less than one year 48.7
    Age (years) 34.5 Ever before in THS work 5.1
    Married 48.6 Immediately before in THS work 1.5
  Kids 38.2 Unemployment  spell
Educational/vocational degree     First time unemployed 50.4
  Secondary 28.9   Registered  in  new  German  Lander 32.5
  Secondary  with  vocational 66.3   Local  unemployment  rate 11.7
    Polytechnic or university 4.8 Registration in
Previous employment history     1994 38.7
Sector   1995 31.5
  Farming  and  energy 2.7   1996 29.9
  Manufacturing 26.8   1st  quarter 32.1
  Construction 15.9   2nd  quarter 20.4
  Trade 13.8   3rd  quarter 24.2
  Transport 5.0   4th  quarter 23.2
  Services 28.9 Entitlements
  State 6.0   Unemployment  beneﬁ  ts 90.3
  Other 0.8   Unemployment  assistance 7.6
Type of last occupation     Unemployment support 2.1
  In  training 9.9
  Unskilled  blue  collar 24.3
  Skilled  blue  collar 28.6
  White  collar 26.7
  Part-  time   10.6         
Source: IABS.
Note: Number of workers   106,383. All entries are in percent, unless stated otherwise.
lowed post-  treatment. Workers who took up a job in the THS sector also 
appeared to enjoy signiﬁ  cantly reduced future risks of unemployment. They 
did not, however, seem to enjoy generally greater chances of future regular 
employment. While our results, therefore, do not lend empirical support to 
the stepping-  stone hypothesis of THS work for unemployed job-  seekers in 
Germany, they also do not conﬁ  rm concerns about potential adverse eﬀects 
on the future regular employment and unemployment probabilities of THS 
workers. If anything, THS work appears to provide an access- to- work func-
tion for unemployed workers that leaves them with a higher probability of 
(THS) employment for the entire four years their subsequent labor market 
states have been analyzed than workers who did not join THS work, as of 
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